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Abstract
It is widely believed that bankers played an important role in causing the nancial crisis
that began in August 2007. In this paper we demonstrate that the compensation system
in the nancial services industry which rewards perceived talents, rather than long-term
performance, leads rational bankers to exhibit belief persistence, overcondence and con-
rmation bias.
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1 Introduction
There were many causes of the credit crisis that erupted in the summer of 2007, but it is
widely believed that the behaviour of the employees of nancial institutions hereafter
referred to as bankersplayed a prominent role. It is argued that these bankers gambled
on a continuation of the US housing boom long after most economists predicted its demise.
They were overly optimistic, allowing leverage ratios to reach unsustainable levels. They
purchased collateralised debt obligations and asset-backed securities and appear to have
deliberately avoided investigating the details of the underlying assets.1
Given that bankers are not perceived as particularly unintelligent, how was it that
they engaged in such apparently irrational behaviour? One explanation is that humans
are prone to cognitive errors involving biases toward their own prior beliefs. A vast social
psychology literature documents that people tend to make the type of errors that the
bankers made: they fail to put su¢ cient weight on evidence that contradicts their own
initial hypotheses, they are overcondent in their own ideas and they have a tendency to
avoid searching for evidence that would disprove their own theories. These types of errors
are known as conrmation bias and a number of reasons have been advanced for why
they are made. One explanation is emotional factors: it appears that many politicians
and much of the public believe that greed played a role in the case of the bankers. It
is also argued that the evolutionary development of the human brain has facilitated the
ability to use experience-based techniques which provide good judgements quickly, but
which can also lead to systematic biases, and some analysts have suggested that these
fast and frugal heuristics were to blame for the bankers misbehaviour.2 Coates and
Herbert (2008) advance the notion that steroid feedback loops may explain why male
bankers exhibited overcondence when caught up in a bull market.
The rewards system in the nancial services industry has also been blamed. Pay is
based on a bonus system that depends on perceived talents, rather than on long-term
1See Rajan (2008) for a discussion of this.
2See, for example, Vanguard Research (2011).
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results. Bankers who are viewed as exceptionally talented receive vast rewards, lest
they be snatched away by competitors; those viewed as less able quickly nd themselves
unemployed. Apparently, as a consequence of this system, bankers have an incentive to
distort their behaviour and to act in a way that - somehow - makes them look competent,
even though it leads to bad results in the long run. Discussing bankersavid participation
in the subprime mortgage market, Allan Meltzer remarked, These are my MBA students,
not just mine but MBAs from Harvard, Stanford, Pennsylvania. They were buying and
selling this garbage. Are they so stupid? They got compensated for doing it. If they
didnt do it theyd lose their jobs.3
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that in many instances what seems to be
irrational behaviour in the form of conrmation bias may instead be rational behaviour
in response to the compensation system in the nancial services sector. To show this,
we consider a scenario where an individual takes an action, such as making a prediction,
and the consequences of this action are not known until sometime in the future. The
individual cares, not just about making the best choice, but also about how competent
he is perceived to be in the period between when he acts and when the consequences of
his action are revealed. It is demonstrated that the individuals incentive to manipulate
beliefs about his ability leads him to distort his actions in a way that is observationally
equivalent to conrmation bias.
We present three variants of a simple model where an expert, who we think of as
a banker, takes an observable action. Experts di¤er in their ability to take the correct
action and this ability is their private information. We model this by assuming that prior
to selecting an action the expert receives a noisy signal indicating which action is likely to
be best. The probability that the signal is correct is viewed as the experts competency
and it and the signal are known only to the expert. In the long run, it is learned whether
the action taken by the expert is the best one or not and at this later time the expert
receives a payo¤ that is higher if he chose correctly than if he did not. In the short run,
3Quoted in Samuelson (2008).
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however, it is not known if the expert made the right choice and his reward depends
instead upon how competent he is perceived to be.
In the rst variant of the model, presented in Section 2, the expert chooses an action,
which we view as making a forecast, and is then confronted with publicly observable
conicting information of known quality. He must then choose whether or not to change
his forecast. We show that relatively able experts, those whose signals are of better quality
than the public signal, maintain their original prediction as do some or all of the experts
whose signals are of lower quality than the public signal. The payo¤ to masquerading
as a more competent expert exceeds the benet of making a choice that is more likely
to be correct. Strikingly, we nd that even when the public signal is almost certainly
correct, it is possible for all experts to persist in forecasting an event that will almost
certainly not occur. Thus, the payo¤ structure leads to behaviour which looks like the
type of conrmation bias that is known as belief persistence. The model in this section
is related to those in the anti-herding literature, such as Avery and Chevalier (1999) and
Levy (2004) and we compare these models to ours.
In the second variant of the model, presented in Section 3, the expert receives his
private information and chooses an action. He is then asked how likely he thinks it is
that he has chosen the best action. In the long run, if his action turns out to be wrong,
then he bears a cost that is increasing in the likelihood that he said that he had chosen
correctly. Even though it is potentially costly to the expert to claim that it is likely that
he made the best choice and there is no intrinsic benet to doing so, if the payo¤ to being
viewed as competent is high enough, experts will claim to be more certain than they are.
Relatively competent experts will pool, all claiming to be correct with certainty. Less
competent experts will separate, but they too all overstate their ability. This closely
resembles the type of conrmation bias known as overcondence. Alternative views of
overcondence are presented by Brocas and Carrillo (2002) and Van den Steen (2004),
discussed in Section 3.
In the third variant of the model, presented in Section 4, the expert receives his pri-
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vate information and chooses an action. He is then given the opportunity to acquire
costly additional information which, if his initial choice is incorrect, might conrm this.
The expert can then choose whether or not to pursue his initial action. In this scenario,
relatively competent experts value the additional information less than less competent
experts because they are unlikely to be wrong and, hence, unlikely to learn anything.
If the most competent expert chooses not to acquire the additional information, then,
whether or not acquiring the additional information is observable, a range of less compe-
tent experts will pool with the most competent experts and also choose not to acquire
more information. This is similar to the classical form of conrmation bias: a tendency
to fail to search for disconrming evidence.
Our paper concludes with Section 5. There we consider some alternative applications
of our framework.
2 Belief Persistence
And I think 2000 will be a good year as well. Abby Cohen, famously bullish
partner at Goldman Sachs, 19994
Suppose that you are a banker who has invested in a particular asset and that new
data has emerged making it apparent that the price of this asset is unsustainably high.
You realise that your investment decision was likely the wrong one. Do you reverse your
position in response to the new information? Or, would you reason that your boss would
view you as incompetent rst buying and now sell selling: that changing your position
would threaten a sizable bonus payment and perhaps your job. The incentive to remain
long and collect a large short-term payment may outweigh the likely eventual cost to your
reputation when it is revealed that you made the wrong choice.
In this section, we present a model of optimising experts who cling to their beliefs in
the face of contradictory evidence. We suppose that an expert makes a forecast and is
4Quoted in Gilpin (1999)
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then presented with conicting evidence, after which he has the opportunity to continue
with his initial forecast or to change it. In particular, we have in mind a banker who
makes a forecast so that his customers or his employer can make the best investment
decision. Eventually, it will be revealed whether or not the banker is correct. While
the banker would prefer to be later proven right than wrong, his bonus in the meantime
depends upon how competent he is perceived to be. We demonstrate that even if new
evidence makes an expert believe that his initial forecast is likely to be incorrect, the
desire to be seen as competent may prevent him from revising his prediction. Thus,
although he is entirely rational, he exhibits behaviour that is observationally equivalent
to the cognitive error of belief persistence.
Formally, we assume that one of two events will occur and that ex ante, each is equally
likely. Initially, the expert receives a signal indicating which of the events will occur. Both
this signal and the probability that it is correct, denoted by , are the experts private
information. We refer to  as the experts competency and it is common knowledge that
it is drawn from a uniform distribution on [1=2; 1] :
After receiving his signal the expert publicly forecasts which of the two events will
occur. Then, a publicly observed noisy signal either agrees or disagrees with the experts
forecast. This public signal is correct with commonly known probability p 2 [1=2; 1).
After observing the public signal, the expert makes a second forecast, either persisting
with his original forecast or changing it. After observing his decision, the market updates
its beliefs about the experts competency. Sometime in the future, the event occurs and
is observed.
The experts (discounted) payo¤ is +P , where  is the markets assessment of the
experts competency after he has made his second forecast, but before the event occurs,
and P is a variable that equals one if the experts forecast later turns out to be correct
and zero otherwise. We refer to  as the experts (short-term) reputation. The strictly
positive parameter  is the weight that the expert puts on his reputation relative to his
desire to forecast correctly.
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The form of the objective function, in particular, the short-run payo¤ the bonus
 for perceived competency, is exogenous to our model and chosen because it appears
to mimic real-world objective functions in the nancial services industry. It is possible
that this is a consequence of bankers being unable to commit themselves to long-run
employment in a rm and a lack of rm-specic human capital in the industry. It is
assumed that the experts competency matters to the rm in other ways than his ability
to forecast. This is because, as will be seen in this section, more competent experts do
not necessarily make better second-round forecasts.
The equilibrium concept used throughout the paper is the natural one for signalling
games: the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. In signalling games, the rst player is
the sender of a signal. He has private information about his type and he chooses a strategy.
Here, player one is the expert who has private information about his competency. His
strategy is a probability distribution over his two possible actions: to persist with his
original forecast in the face of conicting public information, or to change it. Player
two, here the market, has prior beliefs about the senders type and these prior beliefs
are common knowledge. Player two makes a conjecture about how player ones strategy
depends upon player ones type. Then, after observing player ones action, player two
updates his beliefs using Bayesrule. It is required that player one chooses a strategy
that maximises his welfare, taking into account player twos conjecture about his strategy
and how his action will a¤ect player twos posterior beliefs. Player twos conjecture about
player ones strategy must turn out to be correct.5
As he has no other information and as his priors are at, the expert initially forecasts
the event that his signal favours. If the public signal favours the same event, then he has
no reason to change his forecast. We consider the more interesting case where the public
signal does not favour the same event. Given that the public information favours an event
at odds with the experts original forecast, the market conjectures that the probability
that an expert with competency  does not change his forecast is 	c (). The market
5See Fudenberg and Tirole (1992).
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observes the action A of the expert: either he does not change his forecast (A = N)
or he does change it (A = C). Then the market updates its beliefs about the experts
competency. The markets conjectured joint probability density function of  and A is
denoted by h (;A). The marginal density of A is denoted by h (A). Thus, in accordance
with Bayes Rule, the conditional probability density function of  given A and is
h (jA) = h (;A) =h (A) = h (;A) =
Z 1
1=2
h (p;A) dp
=
8><>:
	c()g(;p)R 1
1=2	c(p)g(p;
p)dp
if A = N and
R 1
1=2
	c (p) g (p; 
p) dp > 0
[1 	c()]g(;p)R 1
1=2[1 	c(p)]g(p;p)dp
if A = C and
R 1
1=2
[1 	c (p)] g (p; p) dp > 0;
(1)
where g (; p) is the ex ante probability that the public signal di¤ers from the experts
signal when the expert has competency : We have
g (; p) =  (1  p) + (1  )p: (2)
Given that the public information di¤ers from the experts original forecast, if the
market observes action A then its expectation of the experts competency is
A =
Z 1
1=2
ph (pjA) dp: (3)
Using Bayes Rule, after observing both his private signal and the conicting public signal,
the expert believes that his original forecast is correct with probability
 (; p)   (1  
p)
 (1  p) + (1  )p : (4)
Thus, the expected payo¤ to an expert with competency  of choosing action A is
8><>: 
N +  (; p) if A = N
C + 1   (; p) if A = C:
(5)
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By equation (5), the expert maximises his payo¤ if and only if
N +  (; p)
8>>>><>>>>:
>
=
<
9>>>>=>>>>;
C + 1   (; p) and 	()
8>>>><>>>>:
= 1
2 [0; 1]
= 0
9>>>>=>>>>; ; (6)
where 	() is the actual probability that an expert with competency  does not change
his forecast. By equation (4), 1   2 (; p) is strictly decreasing in  on 1
2
; 1

, with
1 2 (p; p) = 0: Thus, as the expert takes   N   C > 0 as given, his optimisation
problem has a threshold solution. If 
 
N   C > 1   2  1
2
; p

, then he chooses
strategy N . If there exists a  such that 
 
N   C = 1 2 (; p), then he chooses
N if  >  and C if  < : If  =  then he is indi¤erent between randomisations
over N and C.
In equilibrium the markets conjecture must be correct: 	c () = 	 (). Thus, the
equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium characterised by a  such the expert does not
change his forecast if his competency is greater than  and he does change it if his
competency is less than . We have
	()
8>>>><>>>>:
= 1
2 [0; 1]
= 0
9>>>>=>>>>;, 
8>>>><>>>>:
>
=
<
9>>>>=>>>>; 
: (7)
Substituting equation (7) into equation (1) and the result into equation (3) yields
A = A (; p) =
8><>:
R 1
 pg (p; 
p) dp=
R 1
 g (p; 
p) dp if A = N and  < 1R 
1=2
pg (p; p) dp=
R 
1=2
g (p; p) dp if A = C and  > 1
2
:
(8)
As seen in equation (1), if a particular action is never chosen in equilibrium, then
Bayesrule cannot be used to form the posterior distribution if such an action were to
be observed. Thus, A (; p) is not dened in equation (8) if A = N and  = 1 or
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if A = C and  = 1
2
: That is, if no expert ever sticks with his original forecast, then
Bayesrule cannot be used to specify the markets beliefs, were the market to observe
the out-of-equilibrium, or probability zero, phenomenon of an expert persisting with his
original forecast and if all experts stick with their original forecast, it cannot be used to
specify the markets beliefs if the market were to observe an expert changing his forecast.
As any beliefs are admissible, we make the following intuitively appealing assumption.
Assumption 1. N (1; p) = lim!1N (; p) = 1 and C
 
1
2
; p

=
lim!1=2C (; p) = 12 :
Assumption 1 says that if all types of experts change their forecast and an expert
were seen not changing his forecast, then the market would believe that the expert is the
most competent type. Likewise, if no type of expert changes his forecast and an expert
were seen changing his forecast, then the market would believe that the expert was the
least competent type. We discuss the implications of Assumption 1 later in this section.
Using equations (7) and (8), we have the following denition
Denition 1. An equilibrium is a  2 1
2
; 1

such that
N (; p) +  (; p)
8>>>><>>>>:
>
=
<
9>>>>=>>>>;
C (; p) + 1   (; p) and 
8>>>><>>>>:
= 1
2
2 1
2
; 1

= 1
9>>>>=>>>>; : (9)
Let ~  6 (2p   1) (3  2p) = (5  4p). Then we have the following result.
Proposition 1. If  < ~ then there exists a unique equilibrium  and it has the property
that  < p: Furthermore, if   ~ then there is a unique equilibrium where no expert
changes his forecast.
Proof. The proofs of all of the Propositions are in the Appendix.
If experts care enough about their reputation, then there is a pooling equilibrium
where no expert ever changes his forecast when faced with conicting public information.6
6This pooling equilibrium is similar to the one in Cho and Kreps (1987). The senders of the better-
quality signals are not able to separate themselves from the senders of the poorer-quality signals because
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Otherwise, there is an equilibrium where highly competent experts (those with  2
[p; 1]) do not change their mind in the face of conicting information because their own
information is better than the public information. Experts of intermediate competency
(those with  2 (; p)) also do not change their forecast. Their private information
is worse than the public information but the greater-than-even probability of predicting
the wrong outcome if they do not change their forecast is worth the reputational gain
from pooling with more competent experts. Relatively incompetent experts (those with
 2 1
2
; 

) change their forecast. Their private information is su¢ ciently worse than the
public information that the reputational gain from masquerading as a more competent
expert is not worth the expected cost of an incorrect forecast.
The following intuition is useful in understanding the result. Clearly, an equilibrium
cannot have  > p. If there were such an equilibrium, then any expert with competency
 2 (p; ) would nd it preferable both in terms of making the best forecast and in
terms of his reputation  to defect from the equilibrium and not change his forecast.
There also can be no equilibrium with  = p. If there were, all experts with  below,
but su¢ ciently close, to p would defect. The expected increased cost of making the
incorrect forecast would be negligible compared to the jump in their reputation.
10.8750.750.6250.5
1
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0.25
0
-0.25
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Fig 1. Belief Persistence Equilibrium
the action space is limited. It di¤ers from the pooling equilibrium in Kreps and Wilson (1982) where the
senders of the better quality signals not only have limited ability to separate themselves, but as they
are assumed to be mechanistic also have no incentive to do so.
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A formal proof of the proposition is found in the Appendix, but a sketch is as follows.
By equation (9), an equilibrium with  2  1
2
; 1

satises 

N ()  C () = 1  
2 (; p). The right-hand side of this equation is the experts expected cost if he does
not change his forecast in the face of conicting information and it equals the likelihood
that he is correct if he does not change his forecast minus the likelihood that he is correct
if he does change his forecast. It is decreasing in , going to 1
2
as  goes to 1
2
and to
zero as  goes to p: This is shown in Figure 1, drawn for p = :75: The left-hand side
of the equation is the experts reputational gain if he does not change his forecast. It is
strictly positive and is demonstrated in the formal proof to be strictly increasing. The
curve representing the left-hand side of the equation shifts up as  increases and is shown
in Figure 1 for  = 1. From the geometry, it is clear that as long as  is not too large, the
curves representing the left- and right-hand sides of equation (9) cross exactly once at
some  2  1
2
; p

. If  is su¢ ciently large, the curve representing the right-hand side lies
above the curve representing the left-hand side on
 
1
2
; 1

and the equilibrium has  = 1
2
:
An implication of Proposition 1 is that an increase in the quality of the public signal
can increase the size of the set of experts who do not change their forecast when faced
with conicting and better quality public information. To see this, suppose that  is
su¢ ciently large that, given p,  > ^. Then experts pool: no expert changes his mind
and the set of experts who continue to forecast an event that they believe is the less likely
is [; p) ; where  = 1
2
. A marginal increase in p has no e¤ect on  (^ is continuous
in p); hence, the set [; p) is enlarged.
Another  and striking  implication is that even when the public information is
almost perfect, it is possible for all experts to continue to predict an event that they
know is virtually certain not to occur. To see this, suppose that p ! 1. If  = 1
2
,
then an expert who changes his forecast is believed to have competency 1
2
and his revised
forecast is correct with probability one. His payo¤ is thus 
2
+1: An expert who does not
change his forecast is believed to have the average competency, conditional on initially
forecasting incorrectly, of
R 1
1=2
p (1  p) dp= R 1
1=2
(1  p) dp = 2
3
. His forecast is incorrect
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with probability one; hence his payo¤ is 2
3
. As long as   6, it is an equilibrium for all
experts to continue to forecast an event that will almost certainly not occur.
In this section, attention was restricted to equilibria where out-of-equilibrium beliefs
were specied as the limits of equilibrium beliefs. However, other specications of beliefs
can result in other equilibria. In particular, there may be pooling equilibria where all
experts change their forecast and an expert who changes his forecast is believed to have
the average competency, conditional on initially forecasting incorrectly, of 2
3
. Such an
equilibrium might be supported by the out-of-equilibrium belief that an expert who does
not change his forecast is the worst possible type: his competency is 1
2
. To demonstrate
that this is an equilibrium, it is su¢ cient to demonstrate that no expert would deviate
from it. The expert with the most incentive to deviate from it is the most competent
expert. Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show that an expert with  = 1 would not deviate.
Such an expert would receive a payo¤ of 2
3
from following the equilibrium strategy and
a payo¤ of 
2
+ 1 from deviating. Hence, if   6 such an equilibrium exists.
This type of pooling equilibrium is unappealing as the out-of-equilibrium beliefs are
not sensible. Why would the market believe that an expert who deviates is the type
of expert who has the least incentive to deviate? The problem, as previously noted, is
that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept does not place any restrictions on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs, other than that they support the equilibrium. It is typical to rule
out pooling equilibria in signalling models that are supported by implausible beliefs by
requiring that equilibria satisfy the D1 criterion.7
This is not the rst paper to demonstrate that reputational or career concerns can
distort decision making. The results in this section are related to the literature on anti-
herding. In Avery and Chevalier (1999), two experts who care about being perceived as
competent and who may have private information about their ability make forecasts in
succession. If the second expert has su¢ ciently precise private information that he is of
low competency, he may contradict the rst experts forecast with positive probability,
7See Ramey (1996). We discuss the D1 criterion in more detail in the next section.
12
even though he believes it likely that the rst expert is correct. In Levy (2004), experts
who care about their reputations for competency and who have private information about
their competency make a single forecast after observing public information. Experts of
intermediate ability signal their competency by departing from the forecast favoured by
the public information, even though their own information supports it. In these models,
as in ours, anti-herding is a result of experts wanting to signal their private information.8
This contrasts with the herding that results in models where agents do not know their
own private information.9
This section has demonstrated that optimising experts appear to ignore information
that conicts with their beliefs, even though they would make better decisions by con-
sidering it. An interesting consequence of this is that more competent experts do not
necessarily make better predictions. Although they make better rst-round forecasts, by
clinging to their original forecast in the face of superior contradictory evidence, experts
with  2 (; p) make worse second-round forecasts than less competent experts.
3 Overcondence
We are hitting on all 99 cylinders, so you have to ask yourself, What can we do
better? And I just cant decide what that might be... Everyone says that when the
markets turn around, we will su¤er. But let me tell you, we are going to surprise
some people this time around. Bear Stearns is a great place to be.James E. Cayne,
8Some other theoretical models of reputation in which experts know their ability and take actions to
signal their types are Trueman (1994) Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006).
Ehrbeck and Waldman (1996) consider the empirical predictions of models in which forecasters know
their ability and rationally bias their forecasts for reputational reasons. These models have some sim-
ilarity to our set-up in that the forecasters are required to make a sequence of forecasts. However, in
contrast to our paper in which the expert observes a public signal after a rst-round action, forecasters
in Ehrbeck and Waldman, only observe a private signal before each round of forecasting. The empirical
ndings of Ehrbeck and Waldman (1996) are rather negative for their reputational model. Since the
low-ability types in their models mimic high-ability types behaviour for some parameter values, the
predicted forecast bias is in the direction of forecasts typical of high-ability types; this prediction is em-
pirically rejected by their data on T-bill forecasters where the bias is in the direction of those with large
mean-squared forecast errors. They argue that their empirical observation is consistent with behavioural
explanations for forecast bias.
9See, for example, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Chamley
(2004).
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Chairman and CEO of Bear Stearns, 2003.10
A popular explanation for why the bankers made so many disastrous decisions in
the run up to the nancial crisis is that they were overcondent.11 A sizable literature
demonstrates that overcondence can damage nancial markets. Papers by Odean (1998),
Barber and Odean (2001) and Biais et al (2005) demonstrate that it leads to excess
trading and lower prots. Papers by Daniel et al (1998), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
and Burnside at al (2011) show that it can lead to a asset-price anomalies, such as
overreactions, excess volatility and bubbles.12 In this section we present a model where
rational bankers exhibit overcondence.
Here we suppose that there is no publicly observed information, as there was in the
previous section, but that after observing his signal the expert announces the likelihood,
; that his forecast is correct. In terms of our banking story,  can be thought of as the
vigour with which a banker attempts to sell his forecast to his employer and his clients.
We assume that there is no direct benet to an expert of announcing that he is correct
with high probability and that there is a cost: if the expert turns out to be incorrect, he
later su¤ers a loss that has a discounted present value of c () ; where c :

1
2
; 1
 ! R+ is
strictly increasing, concave, twice di¤erentiable and has c
 
1
2

= 0:13 We assume that the
weight put on reputation is su¢ ciently high:   c0 (1=2) :
The payo¤ to the expert if he announces that he correct with probability  is then
+ P   c () ; (10)
where ,  and P are dened as in the previous section.
We consider perfect Bayesian equilibria. As in the previous section, we make an as-
sumption that rules out pooling equilibria based on implausible out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
10Quoted in Thomas (2003).
11See, for example, Kohn (2008) and Gladwell (2009).
12See Glaser (2004) for a survey.
13Concavity will turn out to be su¢ cient, but not necessary, for the second-order condition of the
experts problem to be satised.
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Assumption 2. Equilibria must satisfy the D1 criterion.14
Intuitively, imposing the D1 criterion implies that following an observation of an out
of-equilibrium announcement, the public must put zero posterior weight on the expert
being type  if there is another expert of type 0 who has a greater incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium, in the sense that type 0 would strictly prefer to deviate for any
resulting market belief  that would make  weakly prefer deviating to not deviating.
If the D1 criterion holds, then the equilibrium must be separating, except possibly for
an interval of the most competent experts who claim to be right with probability one.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium must have the following form: there is a  2 1
2
; 1

such that experts in (; 1] say that they are certain that they are right. Experts with
 2 1
2
; 

separate: they each announce that they are correct with some probability in
1
2
; 1

and their announcement reveals their type.
Note that the proposition does not rule out  = 1
2
or  = 1. The formal proof, in
the Appendix, borrows from Ramey (1996). The strategy is to demonstrate that if the
D1 criterion holds and if any two experts of di¤erent types pool at any announcement
other than  = 1, then the more competent expert has an incentive to deviate. Pooling
with  = 1 is not ruled out by the D1 criterion, but there is no equilibrium where a less
competent expert chooses  = 1 and a more competent expert chooses  < 1. To see this,
suppose that the market believes that an expert who chooses  = 1 is more competent
than an expert who chooses  < 1. Then if the less competent expert is willing to choose
 = 1 to be thought more competent, the more competent expert must also be willing.
The market conjectures that a policy maker of type  2 1
2
; 

announces that he is
correct with probability c () < 1: Separability implies that c :

1
2
; 
 ! 1
2
; 1

is one
14Let f () ;() ; g be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Let ^ be an out-of-equilibrium action and
suppose that ^ 2  12 ; 1 is the markets assessment of the experts type if it observes such an action.
Suppose that there is a non-empty set of expert types S0   12 ; 1 such that for every expert of type
 =2 S0 who weakly prefers following the out-of-equilibrium strategy ^ and being thought to be type ^
to following his equilibrium strategy  () and being thought to be type ( ()) there exists an expert
of type 0 2 S0 who strictly prefers following the out-of-equilibrium strategy ^ and being thought to be
type ^ to following his equilibrium strategy  (0) and being thought to be type ( (0)). Then the
equilibrium violates the D1 criterion unless, upon observing ^, the market infers that the experts type
 2 S0.
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to one. Hence, upon observing  < 1, the market infers that the expert is type  1c ().
Thus
 =
8><>:
+1
2
if  = 1
 1c () otherwise.
(11)
In equilibrium, the markets conjecture must be correct and c (
) =  (). Suppose
that there is an interior threshold  2  1
2
; 1

. Then the threshold expert, the one with
competency  = , must be indi¤erent between announcing that he is correct with
probability one and announcing that he is correct with probability  () : If he claims
to be correct with probability one, then by equation (11), the markets assessment of his
competency is 
+1
2
: If his forecast turns out to be incorrect, then he su¤ers a loss of c (1).
Thus, by equation (10), his expected payo¤ is 
+1
2
+    (1  ) c (1). If, instead, he
claims to be correct with probability  (), then he is thought to have competency . If
his forecast turns out to be incorrect, then he incurs a loss of c ( ()). Thus, by equation
(10), his expected payo¤ is  +    (1  ) c ( ()). Equating the expected payo¤
from claiming to be correct with probability one to the expected payo¤ from claiming to
be correct with probability  () yields
 =
8><>: 
 1  c 1  c (1)  
2
 2  1
2
; 1

if  < 2c (1)
1
2
otherwise.
(12)
If  2  1
2
; 1

and  < ; then by equations (10) and (12), the expert maximises
 1c ()  (1  ) c () : (13)
We conjecture that c () is twice di¤erentiable and it will later be clear that this is the
16
case.15 The rst- and second-order conditions for a solution to the experts problem are:
 10c ()  (1  ) c0 () = 0 (14)
 100c ()  (1  ) c00 () = 0 (15)
Using the rules f 10 (x) = 1=f 0 (x) and f 100 (x) =  f 00 (x) =f 0 (x)3 and imposing c () =
 (), equations (14) and (15) yield

(1  ) c0 ( ()) = 
0 () (16)
 
00 ()
0 ()2
  (1  ) c00 ( ()) < 0: (17)
Equation (16) is a rst-order di¤erential equation with no boundary condition. Follow-
ing Riley (1979), it is conventional in signalling models to generate a boundary condition
by assuming that the agent with the lowest-quality private information (here, an expert
with  = 1
2
) would not send a costly signal. The logic is that, in a separating equilibrium,
expectations can be no worse; hence there is no point to costly signalling.16 Thus
 (1=2) = 1=2: (18)
Denition 2. An equilibrium is a  2 1
2
; 1

and a twice-di¤erentiable function  () :
1
2
; 
! 1
2
; 1

such that equations (12) and (16) - (18) are satised.
An equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The expert is maximising his payo¤
while taking into account the e¤ect of his action on the beliefs of the market. The
markets beliefs are (trivially) consistent with Bayes rule and are formed using the correct
conjecture about the equilibrium strategies and the observation of .
Proposition 3. If   2c (1) then all experts claim that they are correct with probability
one. Furthermore, if  < 2c (1) then all experts with competencies in [; 1] claim that
15There are no separating equililbria that are not di¤erentiable. See Mailath (1987).
16This is also the only equilibrium that satises the D1 criterion.
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they are the correct with probability one and experts with  2 1
2
; 

claim that they are
correct with probability  () ; where
 () = c 1 (  ln (2 (1  ))) and  () > ;  2

1
2
; 

(19)
 = 1  1
2
exp

1
2
  c (1)


2

1
2
; 1

: (20)
Proposition 3 demonstrates that experts with competencies in the separating region
1
2
; 

are overcondent, as well as experts in the pooling region [; 1] : It also ensures
that  < 1 and equilibria with complete separation do not exist. The intuition is that, in
the separating region, experts with good quality private information separate themselves
from senders of poorer quality information by saying that they are more condent than
they actually are. However, there is an upper bound on how overcondent an expert can
be:  can be no greater than one. Thus, experts with very good quality information are
unable to separate themselves.17
The overcondence in our model occurs when people are rewarded based on their
perceived abilities; it does not exist if people are rewarded solely on their performance
(that is, when  = 0). There is some empirical evidence that is consistent our result.
While overcondence is widespread, a few types of experts appear to exhibit little or
no overcondence. Examples are bridge players, oddsmakers and weather forecasters.18
For all of these people, the success or failure of their conjectures is immediately and
publicly observable. Hence, it is likely that they perceive their reward to be based on
their performance rather than their perceived competency. In their study of nancial
services professionals, Gloede and Menkho¤ (2009) found that fund managers were the
least overcondent employees. They note that they were also the employees with the
most direct feedback and whose salary was most closely linked to performance.
17Cho and Sobel (1990) consider a general game where the sender of the signals action space is bounded
above and nd that a possible outcome is a set of types pooling at the highest possible action.
18See Plous (1993) for a survey of this literature.
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We are not the rst to explain overcondence in an optimising model; alternative
frameworks are o¤ered by Van den Steen (2004) and Brocas and Carrillo (2002). Van
den Steen (2004) explains overcondence by supposing that individuals have noisy idio-
syncratic information. Thus, agents who select an option are more likely to be optimistic
about their choice than other agents. Brocas and Carrillo (2002) suppose that agents
choose between a riskless activity and an activity that can yield either a high or a low
payo¤, depending upon their competency. If agents are uncertain about their abilities
and information acquisition is costly they choose the risky activity if preliminary evi-
dence about their competency is positive; they do not choose the safe activity without
substantial information that they are incompetent. Thus, it is more likely that incompe-
tent people will engage in the risky activity than it is that competent people will engage
in the safe activity.
It appears to be widely believed that the overcondence of bankers played a key
role in the nancial crisis. The model we present here demonstrates that bankers may
rationally display overcondence, even if they are not actually overcondent. An obvious
alternative explanation is that bankers are genuinely overcondent. Overcondence is
pervasive. Most of us display it our own lives, in our certainty, for example, that we are
better drivers than average.19 A vast social psychology literature documents its existence.
It is possible that the bankersovercondence was real. However, the empirical evidence
on this is mixed. Glaser et als (2010) study of 100 professional traders and investment
bankers nds some evidence of overcondence. Gloede and Menkho¤ (2009), however,
asked 105 forecasters who contributed to the ZEW, Manheim nancial market survey to
rank their own ability compared to the average ability on a scale of 1 - 21; the mean
answer of 11.9 was only slightly above the average of 11.0.
19This is shown in numerous studies. Svenson (1981), for example, found that eighty percent of survey
respondents claimed to be in the top thirty percent of all drivers.
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4 Disconrming Evidence
But how exactly does a bank, such as UBS, conjure up losses larger than the gross
domestic product of many countries... ?Gillian Tett, 20
Since the beginning of the nancial crisis, the Swiss bank UBS has been forced to
write down about $50 billion of mortgage-related assets and, as of end-2007, super senior
tranches contributed to about half of this loss.21 The super senior tranche is the most
protected tranche of a collateralised debt obligation (CDO), receiving payment before all
other tranches, but if the issuer of the CDO borrowed to purchase assets for the CDO
there is a potential risk. UBSs investment banking unit did consider the riskiness of the
super senior tranches when it did its value at risk analysis, but it used the AAA ratings
assigned to these tranches by Moodys and S & Ps. It appears that the unit made no
attempt whatsoever to investigate the fundamentals of the US housing market.22 In this
section we present a model where bankers rationally fail to look for evidence that would
disconrm that their theories.
In this section we consider a scenario where an expert must predict which one of three
or more events will occur. He receives a signal that tells him that one of the events will
occur with probability  2 1
2
; 1

: As in the previous sections, this likelihood that his
signal is correct is referred to as his competency and it is his private information. After
receiving the signal the expert forecasts the event that his signal favours. He then has the
opportunity to invest in the possibility of nding disconrming information. Specically,
if the expert pays a cost q; then if his signal was incorrect, with probability d he receives
private information that (with probability one) will conrm this. The expert can then
continue with his original prediction or he can withdraw his forecast. Later, the event
is observed and it is learned if the expert was correct or not. Because there are more
than two possible events, disconrming evidence does not resolve the uncertainty. Upon
20Tett (2008).
21See Salmon (2008).
22See Shefrin (2009).
20
receiving proof that his original forecast was wrong, the expert no longer has information
that is useful to the market. Thus, changing his forecast is not an option in this scenario.
The experts payo¤ is
+ P d   q; (21)
where the variable P d equals one if he persists with his original forecast and it is correct,
zero if he withdraws his original forecast and minus one if he persists in his original
forecast and it turns out to be incorrect. The variable  equals one if he invests in
additional information and zero otherwise. The parameter  and the variable  are as
dened in the previous sections.
As a benchmark, we rst consider the case where  = 0. Suppose that an expert
invests in the possibility of nding disconrming evidence. With probability ; his original
forecast is correct and he nds no disconrming information. Thus, he continues with his
original choice, which he knows to be correct with probability greater than one half, and
is later proved to be correct. Hence, P d = 1. With probability (1  )d; his original
forecast is wrong and he receives conrmation of this. He withdraws his original forecast
and P d = 0: With probability (1  ) (1  d) his original forecast is wrong, but he
does not receive disconrming information. He continues with his original choice, which
he believes is correct with probability greater than one half, and P d =  1. Thus, the
expected value of P d is    (1  ) (1  d) and the experts payo¤ when he invests in
the possibility of nding disconrming evidence is    (1  ) (1  d)  q.
If the expert does not invest in the possibility of nding disconrming evidence, then
he continues with his original forecast and his payo¤ is equal to the expected value of
P d; which is equal to the probability his choice is correct minus the probability it is
not, or    (1  ). The expert will choose to invest in the possibility of receiving
disconrming information if the expected payo¤from doing so exceeds the expected payo¤
from not doing so. This is the case when 1  q=d > : Thus, if there are no reputational
considerations, it is the less competent experts who invest in acquiring disconrming
21
information; relatively competent experts do not. This is because, as their own signal
is more likely to be correct, relatively competent experts nd that a search for evidence
proving otherwise is less likely to be informative.23 We assume that the cost of acquiring
information is su¢ ciently low that, in the absence of reputational concerns, some experts
would acquire it: d > 2q:
We now suppose that reputational concerns matter, that is  > 0; and we initially
suppose that the investment in information is observable, although the result is not. We
look for a threshold equilibrium where experts with  2 1
2
; 

invest in information
acquisition and experts with  2 [; 1] do not.
Let D be the experts reputation if he does not invest in additional information, N
be his reputation if he does invest and does not withdraw his original forecast and W be
his reputation if he invests and then withdraws his forecast. We consider equilibria where
D > N > W .24 In such equilibria an expert who invests in additional information and
does not receive disconrming evidence continues with his original forecast: this is best
both in terms of maximising his payo¤ from making the best forecast and enhancing his
reputation. An expert who invests in additional information and receives disconrming
evidence withdraws his forecast. This is because an equilibrium strategy of investing
in additional information and persisting with his original forecast with strictly positive
probability in the face of disconrming evidence must have the same payo¤as the strategy
of investing in additional information and always persisting with his original forecast. This
latter strategy is dominated by the strategy of not investing in additional information.
The payo¤ to the strategy of not investing in additional information is D +   
(1  ). The payo¤ to the strategy of investing in additional information and withdraw-
ing ones forecast if and only if disconrming evidence is found is [1   (1  d)] N +
23The argument that, even without reputational concerns, competent experts are unlikely to look for
disconrming evidence because they are unlikely to nd it is related to Oaksford and Chaters (1994)
argument that a failure to focus solely on evidence that might disprove a hyphothesis may be a result of
the properties that gure in a causal relationship being rare.
24As in the previous sections, there may be equilibria supported by unappealing out-of-equilibrium
beliefs that do not satisfy this condition.
22
(1  )dW +    (1  ) (1  d)  q: By the same reasoning as in Section 2, the ex-
pert follows a threshold strategy. There is a  such that the expert invests in additional
information if  < , does not invest if  >  and is indi¤erent over randomisations
if  = : Thus, in equilibrium the market conjectures that the expert follows such a
threshold strategy. Thus, using Bayesrule (as in equation (1)), we have
A =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
D () = 1+

2
if A = D and  < 1
N () =
R 
1=2 p[1 d(1 p)]dpR 
1=2[1 d(1 p)]dp
if A = N and  > 1
2
W () =
R 
1=2 p(1 p)dpR 
1=2(1 p)dp
if A = W and  > 1
2
:
(22)
We specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs as in Assumption 1.
Assumption 3. D (1) = lim!1D () = 1 and A
 
1
2

= lim!1=2A () = 12 ,
A = N;W:
We have the following denition.
Denition 3. An equilibrium is a such that

8>>>><>>>>:
= 1
2
2 [0; 1]
= 1
9>>>>=>>>>; and 
D () + q
8>>>><>>>>:

=

9>>>>=>>>>;
[1  (1  )d] N () + (1  )dW () + (1  )d: (23)
Proposition 4. If   2 (d   2q) then there is a unique equilibrium where no expert in-
vests in the possibility of nding disconrming evidence. Furthermore, if  < 2 (d   2q)
then there is a unique  < ~ such that experts with competency  <  invest in the
possibility of nding disconrming evidence and experts with competency  >  do not.
Thus, we have that when the search for disconrming evidence is observable, fewer
experts will invest in the possibility of nding disconrming evidence than they would
if they did not have reputational concerns. If the reputational concerns are important
enough, no expert will invest in the possibility of nding disconrming evidence.
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We now consider the case where an investment in the possibility of nding disconrm-
ing evidence is unobservable. In this case, the market observes only whether the expert
continues to maintain his original forecast (action N) or withdraws it (action W ). If an
expert does not withdraw his forecast then the market believes that either the expert did
not invest in the possibility of nding disconrming information and, hence,  2 [; 1]
or that the expert did invest, and hence  2 1
2
; 

; but no disconrming evidence
was received. Thus, if an expert does not withdraw his original forecast, the markets
assessment of his competency is
A =
8>><>>:
N () =
R 1
1=2 pdp d
R 
1=2 p(1 p)dpR 1
1=2 dp d
R 
1=2(1 p)dp
if A = N
W () =
R 
1=2 p(1 p)dpR 
1=2(1 p)dp
if A = W and  > 1
2
:
(24)
As before, we have:
Assumption 4. W
 
1
2

= lim!1=2W () = 12 .
If an expert invests in the possibility of nding disconrming information, then
his expected payo¤ is 

[ + (1  ) (1  d)] N () + (1  )dW ()
	
+   
(1   ) (1   d) - q: If he does not invest in the possibility of nding disconrming
information, then his expected payo¤ is N () +   (1  ) : The threshold expert is
indi¤erent; hence, we have the following.
Denition 4. An equilibrium is a such that

8>>>><>>>>:
= 1
2
2 [0; 1]
= 1
9>>>>=>>>>; and (1  
)d   q
8>>>><>>>>:

=

9>>>>=>>>>; (1  
)d

N ()  W () : (25)
Proposition 5. If   4 (d   2q) =d then there is an equilibrium where no ex-
pert invests in the possibility of nding disconrming evidence. Furthermore, if  <
4 (d   2q) =d then there is a  < ~ such that experts with competency    invest
in the possibility of nding disconrming evidence and experts with competency   
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do not.
The model of this section provides a rationale for the seemingly irrational refusal of
bankers to consider disconrming evidence. It does not, however, provide a full explana-
tion for classical conrmation bias, which includes both a tendency to search too little
for disconrming evidence and a tendency to weight conrming evidence too heavily. In
addition, while we have provided an explanation for not considering evidence that would
disconrm ones hypotheses that is consistent with rational optimising behaviour, there
are undoubtedly other explanations as well. Westen at al (2006) provide a physiological
one. They used neuroimaging to study the brains of party loyalists during the 2004 US
Presidential election. Subjects were confronted with reasoning tasks involving informa-
tion damaging to their candidate, the other candidate or some neutral control target.
They found that when subjects had an emotional stake, there was neural activity in dif-
ferent parts of the brain than when they did not. This supports a belief that the brain
seeks solutions that satisfy emotional, as well as cognitive, constraints.
In this and the previous two sections, the desire of experts to be seen as competent
distorts their behaviour. In typical signalling models the harm caused by suboptimal
behaviour may be mitigated be the increased information available to the market about
the senders of the signals types. Here, however, the signalling does not necessarily
convey more information about the experts competency. In the belief persistence model
of Section 2 and in the model of this section, in the absence of reputational concerns,
the experts would split into two pools, one consisting of more competent experts and
one consisting of less competent experts. With relatively weak reputational concerns, the
experts still split into two pools, although there would be more experts in the relatively
competent pool and fewer in the less competent pool. With strong reputational concerns,
however, there is complete pooling and the market has less information than it would have
without reputational concerns. In the overcondence model of Section 3, in the absence
of reputational concerns the experts would pool With strong reputational concerns there
would also be pooling: everyone would exhibit the same perfect condence. However,
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with weak reputational concerns there is some separation and the market does gain some
information relative to what it would have had with no reputational concerns.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate that a desire to appear competent may explain what
appear to be the cognitive errors that are known as conrmation bias. Our motivation is
an explanation of the actions of bankers. We chose bankers as the subject of our research
because their apparent cognitive errors in the run up to the recent nancial crisis have
been so widely documented and because of the important policy implications of their
behaviour. However, our framework can explain what appear to be cognitive errors in
other contexts where people are rewarded in the short run for their perceived ability, as
well as for their performance in the long run.
The research of Bogan and Just (2009) suggests another economic application. They
note that the academic literature has demonstrated that most mergers either add no
shareholder value for the acquiring rm or reduce it and they argue that once executives
have identied a potential merger, they avoid seeking out information that would dis-
conrm the benets of the merger. Tuchman (1984) suggests a political application. She
describes several examples of governments continuing to justify policies that they had
committed themselves to long after it became apparent that their cause was lost. Nicker-
son (1998) claims that history is full of scientists maintaining their beliefs, long after the
available evidence had suggested they should be abandoned and he suggests that many
theories could have been easily invalidated if scientists had made a serious e¤ort to show
that they were false. Supporters of Ptolemaic cosmology clung to their beliefs despite
mounting evidence against it. The theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones
could have been disproved long before Galileo. In all three of these cases, a desire to be
seen as competent in the short run as well as ultimately right could make these apparent
errors the result of rational behaviour.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Dene L (; p)   N (; p)  C (; p) andR (; p)
 1  2 (; p) : The proposition follows from the following properties of L and R: (i)
@L=@ > 0; (ii) L
 
1
2
; p

= (5 4
p)
6(3 2p) > 0; (iii) @R=@
 < 0; (iv) R
 
1
2
; p

= 2p   1;
(v) R (p; p) = 0. Properties (ii) - (v) are straightforward. We show property (i). By
equations (2) and (8)
A (; p) =
8><>:
2
3
+ 1
3(2p 1)
h
p   2(1 p)2
1 (2p 1)
i
if A = N
2
3
+ 1
3(2p 1)
h
p   121
2
+p (2p 1)
i
if A = C:
(A1)
By equation (A1), @L=@ > 0 i¤ 1=

1
2
+ p   (2p   1)2 > 4 (1  p)2 =[1 - (2p -
1)]2: This is true i¤ [1  (2p   1)] > 2 (1  p) 1
2
+ p   (2p   1) : This follows
because both sides are linear in p and it is true at the endpoints p = 1
2
and p = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let  () be the equilibrium strategy of a type- expert and
let () be the markets equilibrium assessment of  given an observation of . We rst
demonstrate that there cannot be pooling at any  < 1: Suppose to the contrary that
there exists a pooling equilibrium with  () = 0 for more than one  2 1
2
; 1

. Let
0 = sup fj () = 0g. Clearly (0) < 0. Choose 00 2 ( (0) ; 0) :
By equation (10), if  = 0, then a marginal increase in  accompanied by an increase
in  raises the welfare of a type- expert if and only if d > 1

(1  ) c0 (0) d0. Thus,
since 00 < 0, for ~ strictly greater than, but su¢ ciently close to, 0 it is possible to nd
a ~ > (0) such that the type-0 expert strictly prefers choosing ~ and being thought
type ~ to choosing 0 and being thought type (0) and a type- expert strictly prefers
choosing 0 and being thought type (0) to choosing ~ and being thought type ~; for
every   00. Choose ~ su¢ ciently close to 0 that ~ < 00.
Case 1. Suppose that ~ is an out-of-equilibrium action. If type   00 weakly prefers
prefers choosing ~ and being thought type  to choosing 0 and being thought type (0)
then it must be that  > ~. We also have that type 0 strictly prefers choosing ~ and
being thought type  to choosing 0 and being thought type (0) : Thus, for the D1
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criterion to hold it must be that if the public observes the out-of-equilibrium action ~
it believes that  > 00. Thus, (~) > 00: Since type 0 strictly prefers choosing ~ and
being thought type ~ to choosing 0 and being thought type (0), he strictly prefers
choosing ~ and being thought type (~) > ~ to choosing 0 and being thought type
(0). Thus, type 0 defects. This is a contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose that ~ is an equilibrium action. We have that the type-0 expert
strictly prefers choosing ~ and being thought type ~ to choosing 0 and being thought
type (0) ; hence, ~ > (~). We have that a type- expert strictly prefers choosing 0
and being thought type (0) to choosing ~ and being thought type ~; for every   00.
Thus, no expert of type-;   00, chooses ~. This implies that (~)  00 > ~: a
contradiction:
This concludes the rst part of the proof. We now show that if an equilibrium has
a type-0 expert choosing  = 1 then each type- expert,  > 0 also chooses  = 1:
Suppose to the contrary that an equilibrium has a type-0 expert choosing  = 1 and a
type-;  > 0, expert choosing ~ < 1. By equation (10), for the experts not to defect we
require 1  0   [ (1)  (~)] = [c (1)  c (~)]  1  : a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. The di¤erential equation (16) is separable and has solutions
 () = c 1 (k    ln (1  )), where k is a constant. Imposing the boundary condition
(18) yields equation (19). Solving equations (12) and (19) yields equation (20). Di¤eren-
tiating equation (16) yields
  
00 ()
0 ()2
= (1  ) c00 ( ()) 0 ()  c0 ( ()) : (A2)
The concavity of c and   c0 (1=2) ensures that 0 () > 1: This and equation (A2)
ensure that condition (17) is satised. Equation (19) and 0 () > 1 imply  () >  for
 2  1
2
; 

.
Proof of Proposition 4. By Assumption 3 and equations (22) and (23),  = 1
2
i¤
  2 (d   2q) and  6= 1. Suppose  < 2 (d   2q) and let R0 ()  D () N ()
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and R1 ()  d (1  )

N ()  W () : Then by equation (22)
R0 (
) =
3  
6
  1
3
3
2
     d (1  )
2  d
 
3
2
   (A3)
R1 (
) =
d (1  )
 
   1
2
2
3
 
3
2
   2  d  32    : (A4)
By equation (23), an interior threshold requires
(1  )d   q =  [R0 () +R1 ()] : (A5)
The left-hand side of equation (A5) is strictly decreasing, equaling d
2
 q when  = 1
2
and equaling zero as  = ~: The right-hand side of equation (A5) is strictly positive,
equalling 
4
< d
2
  q when  = 1
2
and equalling 
3
3 d
4 d > 0 when 
 = 1. Thus,
9 2 1
2
; ~

such that equation (A5) holds. This  is unique if the right-hand side is
increasing, or if it is decreasing and less steep than the left-hand side. This is the case if
d >  [R
0
0 (
) +R01 (
)] : We have 
2
< d   2q < d; hence this is true if
1
2
+R00 (
) +R01 (
) > 0: (A6)
By equations (A3) and (A4) We have
R00 (
) =
d
6
2 + d   4   dx2
(2  dx)2
(A7)
R01 (
) =  d
6
x (1  x) (2  dx)  2 (2x  1)x2 (1  dx)
x2 (2  dx)2
(A8)
where x  3
2
   2  1
2
; 1

. Substituting equations (A7) and (A8) into inequality (A6)
yields
3x2 (2  dx)2 + d
 
d   4 + 4x  dx2

 dx (1  x) (2  dx) + 2d (2x  1) (1  x)2 (1  dx) > 0 (A9)
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The left-hand side of inequality (A9) is decreasing in d if and only if
 8x3 + 2d   6 + 10x  8x2   16dx2 + 18dx3   2dx4 + 4dx < 0: (A10)
The left-hand side of inequality (A10) is linear in d and, hence, it can be veried to
hold by checking the endpoints. We have  8x3   6 + 10x   8x2 < 0 when d = 0 and
 4+14x 24x2+10x3 2x4 < 0 when d = 1. Thus, it is su¢ cient to show that inequality
(A10) holds at d = 1. This is true if and only if G (x)   x4 + x3   4x2 + 12x  5 > 0.
An interior minimum for G requires F   4x3 + 3x2   8x + 12 = 0: However, F has
no roots in
 
1
2
; 1

; hence it is su¢ cient to show that G > 0 at the endpoints. We have
G
 
1
2

= 1
16
> 0 and G (1) = 3 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. We have that (1  )d   q is strictly decreasing in ,
equalling d=2   q when  = 12 and equalling zero when  = ~. By equations (24)
and (25),  (1  )d

N ()  W () is strictly positive and equals d=8 when
 = 1
2
. This yields the result.
References
Avery, C. N. and Chevalier, J. A. (1999). Herding over the career, Economics Letters,
63, 1999, 327-333.
Barber, B. M. and Odean, T. (2001). Boys will be boys: gender, overcondence and
common stock investments, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 261-92.
Biais, B., Hilton, D., Mazurier, K., Pouget, S. (2005). Judgemental overcondence,
self-monitoring and trading performance in an experimental nancial market, Review of
Economic Studies, 90(2), 167-312.
Bogan, V. and Just, D. What drives merger decision behaviour? Dont seek, dont nd
and dont change your mind, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72(3),
pp. 930-43.
Brocas, I. and Carillo, J. D. (2002). Are we all better drivers than average? Self percep-
tion and biased behaviour, CEPR Working Paper 3603.
30
Burnside, C., Han, B., Hirshleifer, D. and Wang, T. Y. (2011). Investor overcondence
and the forward premium puzzle, Review of Economic Studies, 78(2), pp. 523-58.
Chamley, C. P. (2004). Economic Models of Social Learning, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Cho, I. and Kreps, D. M. (1987). Signalling games and stable equilibria, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 102(2), pp.179-221.
Cho, I. and Sobel, J. (1990). Strategic stability and uniqueness in signalling games,
Journal of Economic Theory, 50(2), pp. 381-413.
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D. and Subrahmanyam, A. (1998). Investor psychology and
security market under- and overreactions, Journal of Finance, 53(6), pp. 1839-85.
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I. and Tirole, J. (1999). The economics of career concerns, part
I: comparing information structures, Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), pp. 183-98.
Ehrbeck, T. and Waldemann, R. (1996). Why are professional forecasters biased?
Agency versus behavioral explanations, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1),
pp. 21-40.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1992). Game Theory, London: MIT Press.
Gilpin, K. N. (1999). Market insight; the numbers may change, but not the optimism,
New York Times, 28 Mar.
Gladwell, M. (2009). Cocksure: banks, battle and the psychology of overcondence,
New Yorker, Jul.
Glaser, M., Nöth, M. and Weber, M. (2004). Behavioural nance, in (D. J. Koehler
and N. Harvey, eds.), Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, pp. 527-46,
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Glaser, M., Weber, M. and Langer, T. (2010). Overcondence of professionals and lay
people: individual di¤erences within and between tasks, Working Paper, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=712583.
Gloede, O. and Menko¤, L. (2009). Financial professionalsovercondence: is it expe-
rience, job or attitude, Working Paper, http://www.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/Forschung/
31
Diskussionspapiere/dp-428.pdf
Hirshleifer, D. and Teoh, S. H. (2003). Herd behavior and cascading in capital markets:
a review and synthesis, European Financial Management, 9(1), pp. 25-66.
Kohn, D. (2008). Testimony before the Senate, in Editors, Fedspeak highlights: Kohn
on risks to banking Industry, Wall Street Journal, 5 Jun.
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. (1982). Reputation and imperfect information, Journal of
Economic Theory 27(2), pp. 253-79.
Levy, G. (2004). Anti-herding and strategic consultation, European Economic Review,
48(3), pp. 503-25.
Mailath, George J. (1987). Incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum
of types, Econometrica, 55(6), pp. 1349-65.
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Conrmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises,
Review of General Psychology, 2(2), pp. 175-220.
Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (1994). A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal
data selection, Psychological Review, 101(4), pp. 608-31.
Odean, T. (1998). Volume, volatility, price and prots when all traders are above aver-
age, Journal of Finance, 53(6), pp. 1887-934.
Ottaviani, M. and Sorenson P. N. (2006). Professional advice, Journal of Economic
Theory, 126(1), pp. 120-142.
Plous, S. (1993). The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, London: McGraw-
Hill, Inc.
Prendergast, C. and Stole, L. (1996). Impetuous youngsters and jaded old-timers: ac-
quiring a reputation for learning, The Journal of Political Economy, 104(6), pp. 1105-34.
Rajan, R. (2008). A view of the liquidity crisis, speech, Chicago.
Ramey, G. (1996). D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of
types, Journal of Economic Theory, 69(2), pp. 796-821.
Riley, J. (1979). Informational equilibria, Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 331-359.
Salmon, F. (2008). How UBS lost money on super-senior bonds, Seeking Alpha, 23 Apr.
32
Samuelson, R. J. (2008). Whos to blame? Why capitalists are capitalisms most dan-
gerous enemies, Newsweek, updated 23 Jan.
Scheinkman, J. and Xang, W. (2003). Overcondence and speculative bubbles, Journal
of Political Economy, 111(6), pp. 1183-219.
Shefrin, H. (2009). How psychological pitfalls generated the global nancial crisis, Santa
Clara University Leavey School of Business Research Paper No. 10-04.
Svenson, O. (1981). Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers?Acta
Psychologica, 47(2), pp. 1438.
Tett, G. (2008). Super-senior losses just a misplaced bet on a currency trade, Financial
Times, 18 Apr.
Thomas, L. (2003). Distinct culture at Bear Stearns helps it surmount a grim market,
New York Times, 28 Mar.
Trueman, B. (1994). Analyst forecasts and herding behavior, Review of Financial Stud-
ies, 7(1), pp. 97-124.
Tuchman, B. (1984). The March of Folly: From Troy to Viet Nam, New York: Random
House.
Van den Steen, E. (2004). Rational overoptimism and (other biases), American Eco-
nomic Review, 94(4), pp. 1141-51.
Vanguard Research. (2011). Market bubbles and investor psychology, Vanguard.
Weston, D., Blagov, P.S., Harenski, K., Kilts, C. and Hamann, S. (2006). Neural bases
of motivated reasoning: an fMRI study of emotional constraints on partisan political
judgement in the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
18(11), pp. 1947-1958.
33
